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ABSTRAK
“Indo-Pasifik” telah menjadi konsep yang semakin banyak diadopsi dalam kebijakan luar negeri dalam
beberapa tahun terakhir. Meski istilah “Indo-Pasifik” masih bersifat multitafsir, Tiongkok secara
konsisten menolak penggunaan konsep kawasan ini dalam kebijakan resminya. Sikap Beijing
digambarkan dalam komentar Menteri Luar Negeri Tiongkok Wang Yi yang mengkritik Indo-Pasifik
sebagai “kembalinya mentalitas Perang Dingin” dan “kemunduran sejarah.” Penelitian ini berupaya
menjelaskan kenapa Tiongkok bersikap tegas dalam menolak konstruksi kawasan Indo-Pasifik, lepas
dari banyaknya interpretasi bersifat inklusif terhadap konsep ini. Dengan menggunakan realist
constructivism theory, penelitian ini berargumen bahwa dominannya narasi containment dan antiTiongkok mendorong persepsi ancaman dari Beijing terhadap konsep Indo-Pasifik. Narasi yang
dominan dalam membentuk kebijakan regional Tiongkok seperti “community of common destiny”
turut membentuk bagaimana Indo-Pasifik dipandang sebagai konsep Barat dengan tujuan membatasi
pengaruh Tiongkok di sekitar kawasan. Lebih dari sekadar mencari inklusi dari konsepsi Indo-Pasifik,
Tiongkok berusaha mendorong visi kawasannya sendiri. Visi Tiongkok diwujudkan melalui melaui Belt
and Road Initiative dan berbagai konsep untuk membentuk tatanan kawasan sesuai dengan
preferensinya

Kata kunci:
Tiongkok, Indo-Pasifik, tatanan kawasan Sino-sentris, Konstruksi Kawasan, Belt and Road Initiative

ABSTRACT
The concept of “Indo-Pacific” has been increasingly adopted in foreign policies during the past few
years. Despite its multifaceted nature, China has consistently rejected the use of the Indo-Pacific
concept in its official policy. Beijing’s attitude was reflected in Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s
remarks that dismissed the Indo-Pacific as a “come-back of Cold War mentality” and “retrogression
of history.” This study explains why China renounced the Indo-Pacific concept despite the increasing
inclusion in defining the region. By employing realist constructivism theory, this paper finds that the
prevalence of containment and anti-China narrative engenders Beijing’s threat perception to the
concept. The dominant narratives in China’s regional strategy, such as “community of common
destiny,” also affect how the country treats the Indo-Pacific as a Western-centric concept, aimed to
limit China’s influence. Beyond seeking inclusion from the Indo-Pacific conception, China advances its
own vision to the region. China’s vision is projected through the Belt and Road Initiatives and various
concepts to shape regional order in Beijing's preference.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of Indo-Pacific has been increasingly used in the policy lexicon during the past
few years. The new regional construct denotes the coalescence of the Pacific and the Indian
Ocean as a single geostrategic space. China serves a pivotal yet unobserved role in the
construction of the concept. As Chengxin Pan (2014, p. 453) aptly argued, the anxiety over
China’s rise has led various countries to “manufacture super-region designed to hedge against
a perceived Sino-centric regional order.” Throughout its iteration, the discourse on the IndoPacific concept has been dominated by the strategy to contain China, whose influence have
stretched beyond its traditional sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific and its periphery
(Heiduk & Wacker, 2020).
The notion of containment is further evidenced by the proliferation of economic and
security initiatives directed against China, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,
known informally as the Quad and AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Australia. In response, China has been consistent in denouncing the
Indo-Pacific concept. The country perceives containment as the underlying objective behind
the regional construct (Liu, 2020). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2018) lambasted that,
"It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas. They [Indo-Pacific concepts]
are like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but soon will
dissipate." Wang's statement captures China's attitude towards the Indo-Pacific: dismissive and
full of suspicion.
China’s views have been further reinforced as the Indo-Pacific concept is increasingly
institutionalised, especially after the first Quad Summit in March 2021, which Wang referred
to as "a come-back of Cold War mentality" (People's Daily, 2021). However, understanding
containment as the sole reason behind China's renouncement reduces the complexity of the
Indo-Pacific regional construction. The term "Indo-Pacific" is multifaceted and has become
more complex as various actors adopt the concept. Unlike the U.S.'s anti-China narrative, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) interpreted the Indo-Pacific concept more
inclusively.
Although the containment narrative as propagated by the Quad countries’ Free and
Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision dominates the discourse, the actual interpretations of the IndoPacific concept are more varied and nuanced. India, for instance, still largely adheres to the
non-alignment principle, which avoids exclusive strategic alignment with a certain country—
including the U.S. as fellow Quad members—to contain China. India is also insistent in using
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the “inclusive” term in its Indo-Pacific strategy, in contrast to “free” and “open” that are
associated with U.S.’s containment narrative (Rajagopalan, 2020). Similarly, Indonesia and
ASEAN also advocate an inclusive interpretation (Pertiwi, 2020). Through its own IndoPacific Outlook, the member states of ASEAN have demonstrated that the concept of IndoPacific is not opposing China’s aspiration. The Outlook specifically "intended to be inclusive
in terms of ideas and proposals" so that the organization can continue on becoming an “honest
broker” (ASEAN, 2019, p. 1). Despite the inclusion and interest that Beijing share with several
countries, China is resolute in renouncing the use of “Indo-Pacific” term in its official policies.
This article explains complex interaction between material and ideational factors that shape
China’s attitude to the Indo-Pacific regional construct.
A number of studies have analysed the Indo-Pacific regional construct. The existing
literatures on the topic can be mapped into three major themes: 1) the Indo-Pacific as a
collective strategy to offset China’s influence and maintain rules-based order (Hu, 2020; He,
2018; Liu, 2020; Koga, 2020); 2) diverging and converging geographic conception of the IndoPacific region (Jakobson & Medcalf, 2015; Haruko, 2020), and in a lesser extent; 3) the IndoPacific regionalisation as the “spillover” of India’s rise to the east (Rajagopalan, 2020; Scott,
2012). In short, the existing literature has discussed converging and diverging views on the
Indo-Pacific concept. While China’s role is crucial and its mentioning is ever-present in the
debate, analysis on China’s response to the Indo-Pacific regional construct has been largely
absent on the existing literature.
China’s response to the Indo-Pacific construct is a crucial but largely overlooked in the
current debate. Among the few writings that discuss the subject, most are focusing on how the
country responds to the Indo-Pacific concept solely as a part of the U.S.’s strategy (Ye, 2020;
Ma, 2020; Liu, 2020). Other writings that focus on the Indo-Pacific more broadly as a regional
concept only discussed China’s perception in brief (Danisov, 2021). The previous studies were
also preoccupied with materialistic approach, focusing on the proliferation of security
initiatives, military build-up, and diplomatic engagement that result in Beijing’s perception of
threat. While acknowledging the importance of existing studies, the mentioned works have not
sufficiently explained the ideational factors behind China’s rejection. It is imperative to analyse
why China reject the Indo-Pacific concept despite the strategic convergence and inclusive
concept that have been promoted by several countries. This article aims to fill the research gap
by analysing the ideational and material factors that shape China’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific
regional construct.
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To analyse the factors behind China’s rejection, this article employs realist
constructivism, a theory coined by J. Samuel Barkin. By using realist constructivism, the
analysis is able to explain both ideational and material factors that shape China’s behaviour.
Apart from the containment efforts directed against China, this article argues that the IndoPacific concept represents the Western hegemony over the idea of regional order. Adopting
such a concept will threaten China’s position in the region; not only by subsuming China into
the U.S.-led regional structure, but also displacing China’s own visions to shape the region.
Containment strategies, such as establishing new institutions and military build-up,
represent material factors that stoke China’s perception of threat towards the Indo-Pacific
concept. Further, the risk of being subsumed into a regional concept that devoid of China’s
influence represents an ideational basis that provides a more comprehensive explanation behind
China's response. For China, the Indo-Pacific concept represents ideational and material
hegemony of foreign powers that must not be facilitated. Asymmetrical power relations among
those who adopt the Indo-Pacific concept can result in incorporation of an inclusive IndoPacific concept, as advocated by ASEAN, into the broader U.S.’s containment strategy.
Further, this power gap can dilute ASEAN’s aspiration to portray the Indo-Pacific as an open
and inclusive region for China (Ho, 2019), resulting in the latter’s vigilance over the concept.
In this context, China’s revisionism is partly evident: China aspires to build a China-centred
regional order which is threatened to be displaced by the Indo-Pacific construct.
The contribution this article provides is threefold. First, it fills the gap in the existing
literature by analysing the China’s perception on the Indo-Pacific concept and regional
construct. Second, this article provides a more inclusive analysis by taking into account factors
that are often neglected when the “Indo-Pacific” term is addressed solely as containment
strategy. Third, this article sheds light on not only material, but also ideational factors that
shape China’s response. This article uses Barkin's realist constructivism theory that will be
elaborated in the analytical framework section.
Before delving into the analysis, the discussion section will map the dominant theme
and narrative that capture China’s vision for regional order. The discussion then examines the
shift in China’s perception to Indo-Pacific following the institutionalisation of the concept.
After analysing China’s perception, the discussion section will examine the power structure
underpinning the Indo-Pacific construct; which actors are dominant and what are the
implications will be discussed in the subsection. The discussion will end with analysis on
China’s attempt to project its own strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This research employs realist constructivism to combine realism's primacy of power and
constructivism's primacy of ideas in analysing China's behaviour. Barkin (2003; 2010) argued
that realism and constructivism overlap at their conceptual core, specifically on the two
branches of the theories. First, classical realism's first image analysis and power-maximising
tendency (Waltz. 1959; Morgenthau, 1985; Carr, 1964). Unlike neorealism, classical realism
heavily implies that norms and values also constitute tools for power. As stated by Carr (1964,
p. 235), "It is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world
order." Second, "thin" constructivism that relies on the primacy of power while believing that
norms and values constitute state's relative power in the international system (Wendt, 1999).
Realist constructivism posits that both ideas and power structure are intertwined in shaping
state's behaviour.
Realist constructivism examines how a particular set of ideas or norms affect a state's
approach under a certain power structure and, conversely, how power structure shapes the
norms or ideas espoused by a state (Barkin, 2003, p. 337). The theory is relevant to analyse
China's foreign policy in this article, given the centralistic nature of China's foreign policymaking and the prevalence of ideas in China’s approach to the regional order. From this theory,
the study identifies two variables that can be observed for the analysis, namely ideas/norms
and power structure.
Ideas/norms can be observed through the prevalent narrative in China’s approach in
defining regional order. For instance, the diplomatic slogans such as China’s "peripheral
diplomacy" and "community of shared destiny" that distinguish China’s approach to the region.
These ideas shape China's power-maximising behaviour in the midst of material and ideational
power structure. In material terms, power structure can be observed from China’s relative
position in the region where power struggle takes place, particularly between China and U.S.'s
allies. In the ideational terms, this study observes which countries are dominant in defining the
“Indo-Pacific” term and how China perceives that dominance as a threat to its regional
aspiration.
By taking both material and ideational power into the equation, realist constructivism
can provide a more comprehensive analysis on China's behaviour. This theory also brings
novelty to the study of China and regional order. In the existing literature, realism and
constructivism have often been used separately on the topic related to the Indo-Pacific, whether
as a concept or regional space. Realist analysis is premised on the idea that China will
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inevitably adopt power-maximising behaviour without taking into account how prevalent ideas
among China’s key foreign policy actors. Realist approaches represented in variety of concepts
such as "power transition" (Shambaugh, 2020) and "Thucydides' Trap" (Allison, 2017).
To explain China’s approach to regional order, the existing research have also
highlighted ideas that shape China’s strategies. Many works have been dedicated on
Confucianism and its impact on China’s foreign policy (Kissinger, 2011; Zhang, 2015; An et
al., 2021). Some works analyse the ideas that shape China’s approach on regional security and
governance, including the “China dream” (Ferdinand, 2016; Callahan, 2016), “Community of
Shared Destiny” (Zhang, 2018), and the long-term goal that these notions sought to achieve,
including as China’s “great national rejuvenation” (Stevens, 2020; Carrai, 2021) and selfconception as the “middle kingdom” (Jacques, 2009; Hui, 2015). Indeed, since Xi Jinping
assumed the presidency, China has coined various concepts that indicate its aspiration to shift
the status quo in Beijing’s favour.
According to the mentioned literature, it is evident that China aspires to gain a leading
position in shaping the regional order. The concepts of “community of common destiny and
shared future” or briefly “community of common destiny” denote China’s vision to build a
regional order centred around the country. This is further evidenced by the “new Asia security
concept” introduced by Xi Jinping (2014) which signifies China’s rejection of foreign concepts
in defining China’s periphery, namely the Indo-Pacific region. Equally important, China also
aims to maximise its power in the regional domain. China’s increasingly assertive stance during
Xi’s administration is embodied by building several initiatives such as the Belt and Road
Initiative and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) seen by many as China’s equivalence
of the Indo-Pacific strategy (He, 2018; Ma, 2020). China’s assertiveness comes from the power
structure where the country is located—where many countries attempt to contain its rising
influence, both in material and ideational areas.
Consistent with core realist assumptions, China attempts to maximise its power by not
only acquiring material resources, but also advocating its own concept of regional order. The
leading role that China seeks to achieve necessitates both material and ideational leadership in
constructing the region surrounding its periphery. This condition engenders China’s negative
perception of any concept where China’s dominance is absent, including the Indo-Pacific
concept advocated by the China’s adversaries. As the implication, the U.S.’s dominant role in
institutionalising the Indo-Pacific concept and Japan’s role during its initial conception makes
the concept aptly fit China’s threat perception.
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This study explains China’s renouncement through analysis on two key variables based
on the theory above. First, power structure that underpins the Indo-Pacific construct, whether
it is the material or ideational power struggle that defines the region. Second, the ideas that
capture China’s vision on regional order, namely the Indo-Pacific region and its subregion, i.e.
East, Southeast, and South Asia. China’s ambition as a great power necessitates a leading role
both in the material and ideational areas in defining the region. Realist constructivism explains
China’s negative perception of the Indo-Pacific concept, which is dominated and constructed
by anti-China narrative and counterstrategy against China’s expanding influence. China’s
vision to regional order also determines how China treats the Indo-Pacific as a newly
constructed region. Analysis on these two variables is detailed on the discussion section.
RESEARCH METHOD
This study is a qualitative research that employs literature review as the primary data collection
method. The method highlights the interpretative nature of the study and emphasises words
rather than quantitative data in analysing China’s perception on the Indo-Pacific concept. This
study analyses primary and secondary data collected from various online sources. The primary
data include state documents, speeches, and remarks from Chinese officials sourced mostly
from the government websites. The secondary data include academic journals, books, online
articles, and news pieces sourced from the internet. In addition, this research also explores data
from the opinion and past interview of mainland Chinese scholars, and China state-sponsored
media such as People’s Daily, Xinhua, and Global Times to map the dominant narrative on the
issue.
To explain China’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific concept, this article utilises the
analytical framework of the realist constructivism theory by Barkin (2003; 2010). The theory
posits that both material and ideational factors are crucial in underpinning a state’s behaviour.
The study analyses the collection of data published surrounding these four events: 1) Shinzo
Abe’s “Confluence of Two Oceans” speech and first Quad establishment in 2007; 2) Quad’s
revival and incorporation of Indo-Pacific concept into national strategies in 2017-2018; 3)
Adoption of ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific in 2019; and lastly 4) first Quad Summit in 2021.
By analysing the mentioned data, this article can elucidate material and ideational factors that
shape China’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific regional construct.
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DISCUSSION
The Indo-Pacific concept has been increasingly incorporated to regional policies since 2017.
While the concept is still characterised by ambiguity, China has consistently refused to use the
term in its official policy discourse. The arguments this article advanced are twofold. First, the
discourse surrounding the Indo-Pacific concept is still dominated by countries that aim to offset
China’s influence. Although ASEAN offers an alternative interpretation, China perceives that
containment strategy still underpins the Indo-Pacific concept due to asymmetric relations of
power in constructing the regional concept.
China perceives that the regional concept is dominantly shaped by Western countries,
particularly the U.S.’s network of alliance in the region. This means not only ideational
dominance, but also material with the proliferation of various Indo-Pacific strategy and
minilateral security initiatives. Western domination over the concept threatens to dilute
alternative vision that calls for inclusiveness in the Indo-Pacific concept, namely ASEAN
Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) that can be subsumed into U.S.’s strategy (Chongkittavron,
2020). As a result, China has decided to not adopt the concept.
Second, the Indo-Pacific concept threatens to dilute China’s vision on regional order.
During Xi Jinping’ administration, China actively seeks to attain a leading position by
advancing Beijing’s own vision for regional order such as the “community of common destiny”
and “new Asia security concept.” Marginalisation and antagonization of China in the “IndoPacific” term implied that the country will not be able capitalise the concept for its advantages.
In this regard, China not only seeks an inclusion in constructing the Indo-Pacific region, but
also a leading position. The following section will examine the ideas that define China’s
perception to Indo-Pacific concept, power structure surrounding the regional construct, and
lastly, China’s vision for the region.
China’s Vision for Regional Order
As a self-perceived great power, China strives for a leading role in shaping its immediate region
(Huang & Kurlantzick, 2020). China’s rise, encapsulated in the visions of “China dream” and
“great rejuvenation” aims to construct a regional order in which China is positioned at the
fulcrum—popularly labelled as “Sino-centric regional order.” As observed in an extensive
work on Chinese grand strategy by Rush Doshi (2021, p. 175), these concepts “serve as a
declaration of China’s interest in building order within the region.” China has coined various
concepts that indicate its aspiration to revamp the existing regional structure throughout Xi’s
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administration. In the context of regional order, Callahan (2016, p. 228) suggested that Beijing
aims to build network of institution that will knit the surrounding region into a “tight network
of economic, cultural, political, and strategic relations” centred around China.
“China dream” was first coined in Xi Jinping’s first presidential speech in 2013 and has
since become the hallmark of his domestic and foreign policy. The concept epitomises China’s
aspiration to become a leading country in global and, more immediately, regional theatre by
the time China reaches its centenary anniversary in 2049. To realise the China dream, Beijing
must achieve four pillars, namely strong, civilised, harmonious, and beautiful China (Kuhn,
2013). “China dream” is closely intertwined with the goal of achieving “great national
rejuvenation” through which China aim to rejuvenate its past greatness by revitalising the
country and achieve its global power status. Although the scale of the two goals is global,
China’s aim to build its power will resonate the greatest in its neighbouring regions. China’s
rejuvenation impacts how the country view its immediate periphery as an arena to consolidate
its influence, and, concomitantly, impacts how China views foreign-made concept such as the
Indo-Pacific as a hindrance to achieve China’s ambitions.
These two concepts symbolize China’s power-maximising behaviour. As observed by
Zicheng, Levine, and Liu (2011), “If China does not become a world power, the rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation will be incomplete. Only when it becomes a world power can we say that
the total rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been achieved.” And as China seek its global
status, the immediate region in China’s periphery—namely the Northeast, Southeast, and South
Asia, or, in other word, the Indo-Pacific region—will become the frontier of China’s power
projection. Over the past two years, China has undertaken various initiatives to cement its
influence in the surrounding region, such as establishing BRI and Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, strengthening its relations with ASEAN, and introducing various concepts
to better portray and cement its position in the region.
Further, in the security area, Xi Jinping (2014) also proposed the “new Asia security
concept,” stating that, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems
of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” By arguing that the traditional structure could not
accommodate Asia’s interest, Xi attempted to legitimise China’s efforts in redefining the
regional construct. Such a role was illustrated in one of Xi’s speeches at the 2018 Central
Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, when he declared that China needs to “lead
the reform of the global governance system with the concepts of fairness and justice” (Xinhua,
2018).
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To conduct its regional diplomacy, Xi Jinping introduced the concept of “community
of common destiny and shared future” or shortly “community of common destiny” (CCD) that
calls for a fair and equitable relations between sovereign nations, especially between developed
and developing world. Xi views that the status quo does not accommodate fair relations
between developing countries, especially Asia. And all through his administration, Xi has
exhibited various attempts to introduce China’s concept of regional order. Instead of becoming
a “free rider” in the existing system, China actively advances its own vision for the region
(Summer, 2016; He, 2018).
The revisionist element of China policy outlook is apparent in its attempt to alter the
status quo which was built upon the U.S.-led regional architecture. In this regard, China views
the Indo-Pacific concept and regional construction as an attempt to thwart China’s vision. Even
since its early iteration, many Chinese scholars contended that the Indo-Pacific concept is a
sort of “manufactured super-region designed to hedge against a perceived Sino-centric regional
order” (Pan, 2014, p. 453). China does not only want to be included in the new regional
construct, which is unlikely considering the U.S.’s and western powers’ dominance over the
concept, but also to advance its own regional vision.
Beijing perceives the Indo-Pacific as a concept that reinforces the existing U.S.-led
regional order. Xia Liping from Tongji University (Chen, 2018, p. 22) argued that the IndoPacific concept aims to regulate China’s rise in an international framework that is dominated
by the U.S.. Against this backdrop, China advances its own vision of regional construction
which is focused to leverage developing countries across the Indian and Pacific Ocean,
especially Southeast Asian and South Asian states. In October 2013, China held a high-level
work conference where it renewed the concept of “neighbourhood” or “peripheral” diplomacy
implemented during the Hu Jintao administration. During the conference, Xi Jinping (2013)
stated that a good neighbourhood diplomacy is the prerequisite to achieve China’s “two
centenary goals”: China dream and the rejuvenation of great China nation.
The conference had reoriented China’s diplomatic focus, from one that was previously
occupied by major powers to the one that focuses more on China’s periphery, including
Northeast, Central, Southeast, and South Asia (Zhang, 2018). China seeks to incorporate the
neighbouring countries into a “single region,” a China-centred region (Summers, 2016).
China’s self-perception as a great power makes the country believes that the vision can only be
advanced under its leadership. After introducing the CCD concept to the 2015 Boao Forum for
Asia in Hainan, Xi Jinping (2015) stated that as a big country, China should shoulder “greater
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responsibilities for regional and world peace and development, as opposed to seeking greater
monopoly over regional world affairs.” Xi’s speech alluded to China's self-conception as the
country who ought to lead the reform and how it could benefit the surrounding countries.
CCD represents China’s vision for regional order. The concept envisioned a new type
of partnership that is more “equitable and balanced” to achieve “common interests of
mankind,” said Former Chinese President Hu Jintao (2012) when delivering his report during
the 18th CCP Conference. In a similar vein, former Chinese Ambassador for Cuba Liu Yuqin
stated that China aims to establish a new political and economic order that is based on equity,
which the status quo failed to achieve. Interestingly, the CCD concept is used by China more
frequently to developing countries' audiences, whereas developed countries are rarely used as
reference to this concept (Zhang, 2018). Its usage implies China’s vision to build a network
where developing countries can be leveraged by China’s ascent as a leading country. China
perceives inherent incompatibility that is posed by the Indo-Pacific concept not only for
China’s interest, but also neighbouring countries that China attempts to support through its
narrative.
Chinese Ambassador to Singapore Hong Xioyong (2020), for instance, wrote in his
editorial for The Strait Times that, “the so-called ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ does not fit with the
common interests of the region and is just a U.S. effort to create regional divisions to contain
China.” Similarly, Wang Yi also contended the Indo-Pacific strategy undermined the prospect
of peace and development of East Asia, during a joint press conference with the Malaysian
Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin in October 2020 (Xinhua, 2020). Perceived under the great
power competition narrative, China’s initiatives to shape regional order are deliberately framed
as an “antidote” for the U.S.-centred regional architecture.
Based on China’s narrative, Beijing’s ascent has to anchor to the national interest of
neighbouring countries. This aspiration is exemplified in one of Xi Jinping’s speeches when
he pledged that the “China dream” will converge with aspirations of its neighbours as the part
of the community of common destiny (Xinhua, 2013). China views that AOIP is still
susceptible to be influenced by the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Its inherent weakness,
moreover, also make its inclusive vision at risk to be diluted. Both ideational and material
factors necessitate China to advance its own initiative, not embracing the foreign concept that
is still malleable and can be directed against the country in its further development. This
prevalent narrative ultimately shapes how China perceives the Indo-Pacific concept and that
perception shifted along the power struggle in the region.
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China’s Shifting Perception to the Indo-Pacific Construct
In the context of regional architecture, the idea of Indo-Pacific was first introduced by Shinzo
Abe in his “Confluence between Two Oceans” speech in 2007. Abe’s speech exhorted a
stronger cooperation between the Pacific and Indian Ocean, especially between the four
countries he called as the “Asia’s Democratic Diamond.” His address later served as an
ideational formation of the Quad. In his speech, Abe “envisages a strategy whereby Australia,
India, Japan, and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons
stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific.” (Hayashi, 2013). Against the
backdrop of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands tension with China, Abe (2012) later added that the Quad
countries must “shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the
Indian and Pacific Oceans."
Over years, the interpretation of the Indo-Pacific concept has evolved and diverged
among the countries that adopt the concept. Thus, understanding the “Indo-Pacific” term as a
single U.S.-led containment effort is misleading and inadequate to analyse this concept. The
Indo-Pacific concept is understood differently in terms of geographic area and strategic
orientation. The 2017 U.S.’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific covers only the Pacific to the Eastern
Indian Ocean on its map; Japan and India’s conception of the Indo-Pacific region, in contrast,
encompasses a wider area, spanning from the U.S. in the Western Pacific to the Eastern Coast
of Africa (Haruko, 2020). Apart from geographic conceptions, the strategic orientation also
varied between counties. The country’s alignment with the U.S. and degree of threat perception
against Beijing determine how they project their respective Indo-Pacific vision.
While the U.S., Japan, and Australia exhibit clear antagonism against China, middle
powers like India and Indonesia still largely adhere to the non-alignment principle
(Rajagopalan; 2020; Kartikasari, 2019). This strategic orientation distinguishes India from the
other U.S.’s allies, as evidenced by India’s rejection of the Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPs) in Indian territory and its insistence of using the “inclusive” word in its Indo-Pacific
vision, in contrast to U.S.’s “free” and “open” (Peri, 2021). India’s refusal to condemn Russian
invasion to Ukraine against the other Quad members adds another example.
The lack of clarity surrounding the Indo-Pacific concept has resulted in a dismissive,
rather than a confrontational, response from China during its early iteration. As described by
Ma (2020, p. 181), China’s initial responses to the Indo-Pacific concept and strategy that
entailed were rather “sporadic, cautious, and reserved,” instead of aggressive. China viewed
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the Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy as challenges, but not an immediate threat that needed to
be addressed in high regards (Zhang, 2019). Perceiving India as the weakest link of the Quad,
China believes that improving its relationship with New Delhi would undermine the U.S.’s
Indo-Pacific strategy.
Beijing’s initial position is summarised in one of Global Times (2017) editorial, a
China-stated sponsored media, that ridicule the concept of Indo-Pacific as “a fresh one, but if
reviewed carefully, it appears as another empty slogan.” The editorial echoed the sentiment
previously delivered by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2018) who described Indo-Pacific
concept as the “seafoam in the Pacific or the Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but
soon will dissipate.” Similarly, Lin Minwang from Fudan University in Chen (2018, p. 23)
stated that the Indo-Pacific concept is still not matured and needs to be developed further to
show its actual significance. The statements pointed China’s perceived weakness to the IndoPacific concept.
Despite its early dismissal, China’s attitude has significantly shifted as the Indo-Pacific
concept has undergone rapid institutionalisation.1 The escalation of U.S.-China competition
has instigated various countries to adopt the term through the lens of strategic policies,
replacing the term “Asia-Pacific” that was commonly used. In 2017, the U.S. State Department
rolled out the FOIP in the U.S. National Security Strategy, which explicitly labelled China as
a “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power” (White House, 2017, p. 25). The establishment
of the “second” Quad in 2017 further signifies the security narrative that define this concept.2
To understand China’s growing perception of the Indo-Pacific concept, Quad’s revival
in 2017 and its subsequent summit in 2021 were critical. First, Quad’s revival and initial
adoption of the FOIP vision exposes the prevalence of the Indo-Pacific concept. Not only that
the Indo-Pacific concept was gaining prominence, the term was also officially adopted into
strategic policies in various countries. Second, it signifies the security-heavy nature and
exclusionism behind the concept (Kliem, 2020). The Quad reconvened when China’s tension
with surrounding countries was escalating. There was dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
with Japan, border conflict in the Doklam Plateau with India, Prime Minister Turnbull’s
accusation over China’s “foreign interference” with Australia, and the overarching competition
with the U.S.
The prevalence of security narrative makes China downplay the potential economic and
socio-cultural dimensions of the Indo-Pacific concept as championed by other actors like
ASEAN. Even when the term is adopted into the economic initiatives, the “Indo-Pacific” term
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is still closely associated with the containment effort against China. For instance, Biden’s IndoPacific Economic Network that explicitly stated to not include China in building infrastructure
and supply-chain cooperation (Blanchard, 2022). The aim to offset the influence and
dependency to China also underpin other regional economic initiatives, including the USJapan-Australia Trilateral Partnership for Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Investment and Supply
Chain Resilience Initiative.
The Quad’s revival has remarkably shifted China’s perception towards the Indo-Pacific
concept, from initially reserved to explicitly opposing the term. During the inception of the
“first” Quad, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao only expressed an unconvinced and suspicious
response when he sought clarification regarding the Quad during the 2007 G8 Summit (Ali,
2007). After the establishment of the “second” Quad, and even more so after its 2021 summit,
China officials responded to this initiative harshly by referring to the Quad as an “Indo-Pacific
NATO'' and “detrimental to international order” (Jaipgragas & Sukumaran, 2020). As
illustrated in Table 1, China’s response has been shifting along the institutionalisation of the
concept, notably after the Quad Summit in 2021.
Table 1. China’s Shifting Perception towards Indo-Pacific
Indo-Pacific Construct

Year

China’s Response

Shinzo Abe’s “Confluence of

2007

Seeking clarification

The “first” Quad established

2008

Dismissive, suspicious

The “second” Quad” established

2017

Dismissive, underestimating

2017-2018

Opposing, referring to as the

Two Ocean” speech

“Indo-Pacific” term adopted in
various national strategies

threat for regional peace and
development

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-

2019

Pacific adopted

Acknowledging shared interest,
yet not explicitly support the
document

Quad Summit

2021

Strongly opposing, referring to
the “Cold War mentality” rhetoric

Source: Author’s formulation from the mentioned data

Quad’s revival sent a clear signal from U.S.’ allies that countering China outweighs the
benefit from maintaining cordiality with the country. Strategic necessity to contain China had
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underpinned the re-establishment of the Quad and the proliferation of the Indo-Pacific concept
(Kliem, 2020). Quad’s security dimension has inevitably engendered China’s perception of
threat which perceives the Indo-Pacific concept solely as the strategy to foil Beijing’s
aspiration. The domination of such narrative was later proven to be self-confirming when
several countries, mostly the West, began to adopt tough policies using the Indo-Pacific
concept, such as the FONOP, Quad, and AUKUS trilateral security pact that provide Australia
with eight nuclear submarines.
China’s opposition to the Indo-Pacific strategy becomes closely intertwined with its
renouncement of the Indo-Pacific as a concept. Chinese officials are persistent in still using the
“Asia-Pacific” term, even when they were asked to respond to the “Indo-Pacific” (Liu, 2020).
For instance, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said, “For a long time the
U.S. has been grossly interfering in the affairs of regional countries in the Asia Pacific
[emphasis added]. Politically, it has tried to drive a wedge between them by promoting the socalled ‘Indo-Pacific’” (Xinhua, 2019a). In contrast to the Indo-Pacific, the Asia-Pacific concept
is still closely associated with China’s pre-eminence. This implies how China perceives power
relations that operates behind the Indo-Pacific construct, which is still dominated by the socalled West.
Power Relations behind the Indo-Pacific Construct
The Indo-Pacific concept has been closely associated with the U.S.'s containment strategy.
Asymmetric power relations characterised the construction of the region, where the U.S. and
its allies serve as a “core,” while surrounding countries act as “periphery.” With such as a
power structure behind the Indo-Pacific concept, China’s officials and most academic debates
have viewed the U.S.’s allies as the only dominant actors that shape the Indo-Pacific discourse
(Ma, 2020). This, in turns, leads China to perceive that such as regional construct is not neutral
and only cement the U.S.’s foothold in the region.
This perception fits China’s growing narrative that foreign power attempts to build a
coalition to hinder China’s rising influence in the region. Speaking during the 100th
Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping stated that China “will never allow
any foreign force to bully, oppress, or subjugate us” and later added that China would not
“accept sanctimonious preaching from those who feel they have the right to lecture us”
(Xinhua, 2021, pp. 8-9) The centenary address portrayed China in the victim position, besieged
by foreign powers that attempt to hinder the country from further ascent. The construction of
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the Indo-Pacific region and proliferation of its strategies are consistent with this growing
narrative.
China’s aspiration to be a regional leader has been enunciated frequently since Xi
Jinping started his presidency in 2013. In alignment with this policy shift, China has become
more assertive in exerting its dominance, such as building artificial islands and military bases
in the South China Sea, increasing military presence in the Taiwan Strait, and growing more
aggressive in asserting its territorial claim (Shambaugh, 2018). China’s departure from Deng
Xiaoping’s era “hide and bide” and “low-profile” foreign policy to Xi Jinping’s “strive for
achievement” are accompanied by two factors. First, China seeks to become a dominant player
in the international stage and, more immediately, in the region. China’s self-portrayal as a
“benign power,” in contrast to the U.S. as a “malign power,” also pushes the country to
advocate its own vision as an alternative to the status quo (Hao, 2015).
These aspirations are shaped by various ideas that pushes China’s rise, notably “China
dream” and “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” After the end of the “century of
humiliation,” China strives for a leading position in the global stage.3 The notion of “China
dream” constitutes four parts by which China aims to be “strong” economically, politically and
militarily; “civilised” by upholding fairness and culture; “harmonious” by maintaining amity
with various partners and diverse class inside the country; and “beautiful” with environment
and arts upon reaching its 100th Anniversary of People’s Republic of China in 2049 (Kuhn,
2013).
China’s optimism through the above narratives notwithstanding, China’s rise also
carries along the paranoia that foreign powers are actively trying to thwart China’s effort to
achieve its goals. This perception of threat has been further reinforced when other countries,
particularly the U.S. who views China as a rival, attempts to limit China’s influence.
Responding to the declassified U.S.’s Indo-Pacific document, Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Zhao Lijian (2021) stated that regional countries should be “clear-headed and
vigilant enough not to be hijacked onto the U.S. chariot or be used as a tool to maintain U.S.
hegemony." In this narrative, the construction of the Indo-Pacific region is perceived as the
U.S.’s act of hindrance that China has previously anticipated in achieving its vision.
Most of the Chinese academic community views Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy as the
continuation of Obama's “Pivot to Asia” or “Rebalancing” (Liu, 2020; Zhang, 2019). For
instance, Zhao Qinghai from the Chinese Institute of International Studies in Ma (2020, p. 188),
referred to the FOIP as an “old wine in a new bottle.” Zhao referred to the continuity of Western
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ambition to compete with China. This view was later evidenced with the proliferation of
security initiatives built under the umbrella of the Indo-Pacific concept.
Different from Obama’s rebalancing, the Indo-Pacific concept lay a more concerted
effort by explicitly naming China as a common threat and building a set of coalitions in the
region (Choong, 2019). This sentiment was echoed by Wang Yi during China’s high-level visit
to Malaysia in October 2020. Answering to the South China Morning Post interview, Wang
stated that the US and its allies “aims to build a so-called Indo-Pacific NATO underpinned by
the quadrilateral mechanism involving the U.S., Japan, India and Australia” (Jaipgragas &
Sukumaran, 2020).
Although Quad initially appeared as a single and unified front, its strategic alignment
varies across members. India, for instance, does not exclusively label China as a common threat
in the region. The country remains wary that exclusive alignment will reduce its diplomatic
manoeuvre, given its tradition of non-alignment (Rajagopalan, 2020). Moreover, Medcalf and
Mohan (2014) also argued that India’ and Australia's self-conception as middle powers may
shape their approach to find a strategic autonomy, instead of following and relying exclusively
on the U.S.. Initially, Australia’s middle power role could also push the country to seek a more
mediational role in the upcoming conflict, following Indonesia and ASEAN states that took
similar approach (Taylor, 2020; Pertiwi, 2020).
While the Indo-Pacific “troika”—the U.S., Australia, and Japan—endorse the term
“free and open” in their Indo-Pacific visions, India remains cautious by advocating the terms
“inclusive” that suggest its convergence with China, as ASEAN attempt to do through AOIP
(Zhang, 2019). India’s hesitance to follow the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy altogether is also
driven by its close cooperation with China in various areas. Looking upon the past withdrawal
of India and Australia from the “first Quad,” it can be inferred that India does not always share
the similar sentiment to that of the U.S. in confronting China (Kliem, 2020), at least until the
AUKUS was established.
China’s fear is becoming a “self-fulfilling prophecy” as Quad and other minilateral
arrangements is becoming more institutionalised, isolating China. By forming a security and
economic network across the newly-constructed Indo-Pacific “super region,” China feared that
other Indo-Pacific countries, particularly Indonesia and other ASEAN states, will be subsumed
into the U.S.-led containment network (Ho, 2019). With most ASEAN members still perceive
China as a main security threat (Prajuli, 2013), Beijing’s policymakers fear the possibility that
ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific vision might be turned against China. The lack of clarity surrounding
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AOIP further affirms China’s perception that the AOIP is still deficient. It becomes clear that
the Outlook cannot convince China to secure its interest in the region by adopting a similar
arrangement.
China’s sentiment was captured on Wang Yi’s remarks on the AOIP when he stated
that the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy might derail ASEAN’s aspiration from building an open
and inclusive region, including for China. He later added that “the Chinese side has always
maintained an open and constructive attitude in this cooperation” (Yi, 2019). Wang’s statement
exhibited the reticent response from Beijing, rather than clear acceptance that ASEAN had
expected by promoting its outlook. Similarly, in the joint statement to commemorate the 30th
anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue in November 2021 (ASEAN, 2021, p. 1), China only
“reaffirms the principle of the AOIP” without explicitly stating its support to the document.
Despite ASEAN’s attempts to promote inclusivity, China remains cautious that the concept
might only serve the U.S.’s interest due to its lack of deliverability that can allay China’s
concerns.
Figure 1. Countries’ Relative Alignment in the Indo-Pacific Concept

Source: Formulated by author from the mentioned data

AOIP’s weakness is also demonstrated by unwillingness of the individual ASEAN
states to push for the adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept. Their mixed-responses were
reflected with dithering to the Quad (Laksmana, 2020). After AOIP was adopted, only two
ASEAN countries, Indonesia and Vietnam, have incorporated the concept into their national
policies.4 Worse, the two countries’ approaches diverge remarkably. Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific
strategy is driven by a normative approach (Pertiwi, 2021), while Vietnam’s is driven by a
rather realist orientation (Ha, 2021). Moreover, AOIP is still lacking operational policies. Most
of the documents are filled with typical ASEAN languages with indecision and no clarity to
address pressing issues such as maritime security. As Laksmana (2019, p. 110) put it bluntly,
AOIP is “defective at birth as far as strategic outcomes are concerned.”
While China delivers a positive response towards the AOIP, it is evident that China
also accounts for AOIP's weakness in its strategic calculus (Chongkittavorn, 2019; Ho, 2019).
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As a consequence, the lack of clarity surrounding the AOIP makes it susceptible to foreign
influence, including from the U.S. who had initially supported the ASEAN’s proposal. This
condition affirms China’s perception on “core and periphery” relations that underpin IndoPacific power structure, where the U.S. and its allies have a dominant role in shaping the IndoPacific construct. Instead of pushing for an inclusive Indo-Pacific concept, China advances its
own vision for the region.
Appropriation of the Indo-Pacific Concepts
Before the Indo-Pacific concept was rearticulated in 2017, China had long introduced its own
vision for the region. Instead of adopting the existing term, China seeks to build the region by
using its own initiative. This sub-section details China’s own strategy to build the Indo-Pacific
region as its sphere of influence. Most Chinese scholars on the issue argued that the BRI is the
China’s equivalent of Indo-Pacific strategy (Ma, 2020). On another observation, Rory Medcalf
(2018) opined that the BRI can be seen as Indo-Pacific strategy with “Chinese characteristics.”
On many occasions, BRI were often compared to the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy in
terms of its significance and deliverable for regional development. For instance, in response to
Mike Pompeo’s remarks during the Indo-Pacific Business Forum, People’s Daily (2018)
editorial wrote that the U.S.’s investment for the “open” Indo-Pacific region will not cripple
the Belt and Road Initiative.” In another editorial at Global Times, Peng (2019) contended that
the BRI is “not a countermeasure to the Indo-Pacific strategy” and later added that the IndoPacific strategy “seems to be moving more in the direction of confrontation." These sentiments
presented BRI as an equivalence and better alternative to U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Instead of adopting the “Indo-Pacific” term, China has been appropriating various
elements of the Indo-Pacific concept in its regional strategy. He (2018) argued that China
adopted a “hybrid” Indo-Pacific strategy, different from the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific construct that
privileges maritime over continental features from the surrounding region. China’s “IndoPacific strategy” combines both maritime and continental approaches in addressing the region.
The equivalence of the U.S.’s strategy is manifested through various China-led initiatives, such
as BRI and SCO that cover both maritime and continental spans of the Indo-Pacific region.
Focusing in continental area in the north-eastern part of the Indo-Pacific map, SCO
incorporates India into the initiative. Ye (2020) argued that China's decision to allow India’s
accession was not only taken to keep India’s rise in check, but also to hedge against the U.S.’s
Indo-Pacific strategy that also relies on India as one of its main partners. Both BRI and SCO
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exemplified China’s own approach to the Indo-Pacific region that had been initiated even
before the Quad in 2017. Based on the analysis above, it can be inferred that China had initially
adopted its own regional vision. Therefore, espousing the Indo-Pacific concept will not only
harness the U.S.-led regional order, but also dilute China’s own regional visions.
At the first image level, embracing the Indo-Pacific concept might also give adverse
effect to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy that is supported by making diplomatic legacies, such as the
concept of CCD and China dream (Zhang, 2018; Lida, 2020).5 Similar to Hu Jintao’s signature
policy of “Peaceful Development” or Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Point Modernisation,” China’s
regional visions described in the above section can be perceived as Xi’s attempt to builds his
own legacy. Political legacy is crucial to cement the footprint of Xi’s over-a-decade leadership
and legitimise his current leadership. Building political legacy has become more urgent since
the abolition of the presidential terms limit in 2018. Xi’s newly ambitious goals can be
perceived as the pretexts to legitimise his terms extension.
As later confirmed by Wang Yi (2016), “The CCD concept is a core achievement of
China’s diplomatic innovation [under the leadership of President Xi Jinping]. To implement
CCD and rejuvenate the Chinese nation have become the objectives of diplomacy with Chinese
characteristics” (People’s Daily, 2016). The statement shows a close association between Xi’s
personal aspiration and the regional concept that China proposed.
Table 2. China’s Regional Vision on Indo-Pacific
Concept/Initiatives
China Dream

Coverage on Indo-Pacific Area
Global, focusing on Indo-Pacific as China’s immediate
region

Community of Common Destiny

Indo-Pacific area, focusing on developing countries

Neighbourhood/Peripheral Diplomacy

China’s periphery, including Asia-Pacific, Central
Asia, and South Asia

Belt and Road Initiative

Global, covering both continental and maritime area of
the Indo-Pacific, focusing on developing countries

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Northwestern part of Indo-Pacific’s continental area,
Eurasia

Source: formulated by the author from He (2018), Zhang (2018), Summers (2016).
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As detailed in Table 2 above, China has advanced its own vision in defining the regional
order. The ideas imply how China views itself as leading power in the region and, as the
implications, views the Indo-Pacific as a foreign concept that will hinder its vision.
Consequently, China has consistently rejected the construction and institutionalisation of the
Indo-Pacific region, given the prevalence of the containment narrative and power relations
behind it.
Wei Zongyou from Fudan University in Chen (2018) argued that the geostrategic centre
of gravity will shift to the Indo-Pacific region in the upcoming years. Along with this shift,
Beijing believes that foreign powers will try to foil China’s attempts to secure its dominance.
To achieve its “rejuvenation” goal and securing its core interests, China has increased its
presence in many disputed areas, including the South China Sea and Taiwan, whose
reunification is deemed necessary, as stated by Xi Jinping (Xinhua, 2019b). While ASEAN
attempt to portray the Indo-Pacific as an inclusive region through AOIP, the “rules-based”
principle that is used in the document might be used against China, especially in the South
China Sea issue. Fearing that such principles could be iterated as the justification in making an
“anti-China” coalition, China decides not to adopt the concept.6 Further, considering the robust
military ties between most ASEAN member states with the U.S., China feels safer to not
espouse the Indo-Pacific concept.
CONCLUSION
With the latest announcement of the European Union’s and Biden-led U.S.’s Indo-Pacific
strategies, the Indo-Pacific concept has become increasingly pivotal in defining the regional
order. Many attempts to institutionalise the Indo-Pacific concept has made the regional
construct becoming more complex and multifaceted. Notwithstanding this nuance, China has
remained steadfast on renouncing the Indo-Pacific concept. This article yields two arguments
that explain China’s response.
First, despite the call for inclusiveness, the construction and institutionalisation of the
Indo-Pacific concept are still dominated by anti-China narratives. Western-dominated power
structure that underpins the Indo-Pacific also engenders China’s perception of threat in viewing
the concept. Second, the Indo-Pacific concept is still viewed as a foreign notion that poses a
challenge to China’s own regional vision. If China were adopting the “Indo-Pacific” term in its
official policies, it could be seen as a compromise on China’s ambition and diluting China’s
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vision for regional order. In this regard, China seeks not only inclusion in the Indo-Pacific
concept, but also a leading role in its construction.
Beijing’s perception was affirmed by various initiatives the country perceives as
containment efforts, such as the establishment of the “second” Quad—which Wang Yi
dismissed as an “Indo-Pacific new NATO” (Patranobis, 2021), AUKUS, and various
exclusionary initiatives under the “Indo-Pacific” jargon. The increase of the anti-China
narrative affirms Beijing’s rhetoric about “Cold War mentality.” Further, asymmetrical
relations are also evident in the Indo-Pacific power structure. The Quad countries are able to
incorporate the Indo-Pacific concept into deliverable strategic policies. On the opposite,
ASEAN’s visions, which champions inclusivity, remains unclear at the policy level. As the
implications, China fears that Western’s dominance could dilute ASEAN’s vision and turn it
against China.
To maximise its power and achieve the “great national rejuvenation,” China seeks a
leading role in shaping the regional order. Defining its peripheral region at the material and
ideational levels is no exception to this goal. The Indo-Pacific concept is thus viewed as a threat
against China’s aspiration. Without adopting the “Indo-Pacific” term into its official lexicon,
China has moved forward with its own “Indo-Pacific strategy,” mainly through the BRI that
covers both maritime and continental area of the Indo-Pacific. China seeks not only an inclusive
Indo-Pacific, but also a regional concept in which Chinese influence rest at the centre. In this
regard, the inclusivity that ASEAN offers through AOIP is not sufficient to leverage Beijing’s
interest. Not only because China cannot capitalise on the concept, but also because China has
long sought to project its own vision to the region.
Understanding the Indo-Pacific solely as a U.S.-led containment strategy risks not only
overlook the complexity surrounding the regional construct, but also various factors that
constitute China’s renouncement. By taking both ideational and material factors into the
analysis, China's rejection can be analysed beyond a reductionist lens. China will likely
maintain its posture over the Indo-Pacific as a broad concept, given the proliferation of
initiatives aimed to offset the country’s influence. However, apart from its rejection, it is
equally important to note that China also appropriate several elements of the Indo-Pacific
concept. It is evident that China has begun to incorporate the Indo-Pacific elements in its
regional strategy. Moving beyond the ideational debate, future study can delve deeper by
analysing China’ strategy to the Indo-Pacific region, both as a space of competition and
cooperation on its periphery.
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Note:
1

The process and shortcomings of the Indo-Pacific institutionalization are discussed in He & Feng (2020)
The “first” Quad was formed in 2007 by the initiation of then-Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, yet ceased to active
after Australia and India withdrew from the initiative in 2008 in response to China’s opposition. The “second”
Quad re-established in 2017 amidst increasing tension between China and the four countries, then managed to
convene its first summit in September 2021.
3
“Century of humiliation” refers to the period marked by the subjugation and defeat of China by foreign powers.
The period spans from the downfall of Qing’s dynasty after the Opium War in the late 19th century until the
Communist Revolution 1949 when People’s Republic of China is declared.
4
The term “Indo-Pacific” is adopted in various national policies. For instance, Vietnam’s 2019 Defence White
Paper, 13th Vietnam Communist Party Congress, Indonesia’s laws related to the Global Maritim Fulcrum (Poros
Maritim Dunia), and various Indo-Pacific policies advocated by Indonesia to the external audience.
5
“First image” refers to three level of analysis or “image” conceptualized by Kenneth Waltz (1959). The “first
image” refers to the individuals who mainly assume the leading role in defining state's foreign policy, “second
image” refers to the state, while the “third image” refers to the international system where state interacts.
6
ASEAN defines the Indo-Pacific as an open and inclusive region through AOIP (see ASEAN, 2019, p. 3).
However, some principles are deemed threatening for China, including the rules-based order and respect for
UNCLOS that China has violated based on the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision.
2
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